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Abstract 
 
In England and Wales the arrangements for compensating victims of lawyer default, fraud, 
incompetence and misconduct, are extensive. Solicitors, the largest profession, maintain a   
compensation fund. Both solicitors and barristers require practitioners to carry professional 
indemnity insurance covering liability to clients. An agency deals with complaints about all 
regulated lawyers. This article outlines the jurisdictions dealing with lawyer default and the 
mechanisms for delivering compensation. It uses publicly available data generated by 
insurance claims and complaints to identify the causes of lawyer default. It analyses the 
volume and value of claims, the incidence of liability by areas of work and by different types of 
complaint. The article concludes by considering the relevance of, and current limitations of, default 
data in understanding lawyer default and in shaping regulatory policy. 
 
Key words: Liability, Regulation, Professional Indemnity Insurance, Compensation Funds.  
  
Understanding lawyer default in England and Wales: An analysis of insurance and 
complaints data  
Andrew Boon

 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Lawyer default, including fraud, incompetence and misconduct, is a threat to trust in lawyers, to 
confidence in legal services and to a belief in the capacity of the legal system to produce 
justice.1 Understanding lawyer default is the first step to evaluating ways of dealing with it more 
effectively, for example, by greater reliance on liability claims,
2
 and insurance requirements,
3
 as 
control mechanisms. In England and Wales, default may result in disciplinary proceedings, civil 
claims or complaints and is dealt with in a variety of jurisdictions; tribunals, courts and agencies. This 
article explores data generated in relation to cases in these different jurisdictions through insurance 
and complaints records. These data are used to assess the scale and incidence of default, and its 
possible causes, by examining the risks posed by particular activities, individuals or types of 
organisation. The article proceeds by briefly outlining the origins and development of professional 
liability and the range of liability mechanisms in respect of which compulsory professional indemnity 
insurance (PII) is currently required. It then identifies data available in relation to insurance claims 
and complaints and uses it to analyse the volume and value of claims, the incidence of liability by 
areas of work and the frequency of different types of complaint. The article concludes by identifying 
the most salient issues raised by the data, considers the relevant regulatory implications and examines 
the potential for, and limitations of, using default data in shaping regulatory policy.  
     
DEFAULT AND COMPENSATION 
 
The relationship between professionals and their clients was traditionally defined by the 
contractual relationship and the scope of what solicitors call the retainer. The 1930s 
recognition of consumer remedies for negligence
4
 only impinged on lawyers following Esso 
Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. Mardon,
5
 which established the principle of concurrent liability in 
contract and tort and discussed its application to professionals.
6
 This benefited claimants in 
cases where the limitation period had expired in contract but not in negligence
7
 but proving a 
causal connection between negligence and loss remained a barrier to claims.
8
 Barristers 
continued to enjoy immunity from suit in respect most failures of care in conducting a case in 
court. This ‘forensic immunity’ was based on a raft of public policy reasons, including the 
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fact that barristers could not refuse clients because of the so-called cab-rank rule, the risk of 
satellite litigation, particularly in criminal cases, and a perceived threat to the advocate’s duty 
to the court posed by being liable to advocacy clients.
9
 Immunity was extended to solicitor 
advocates
10
 and, following the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990, to all persons entitled to 
conduct advocacy or litigation by virtue of the Act
11
 but, in 2000, the rationale for immunity 
was swept aside by a majority of the House of Lords.
12
 Third parties injured by the actions of 
opposing lawyers fared less well. Fears about the scope of liability for pure economic loss
13
 
left a high water mark of lawyer liability to beneficiaries whose bequests failed because of 
negligence by the testator’s solicitor,14 gratuitous obligations accepted or advice given to 
third parties.
15
 In addition to civil liability in contract or negligence, lawyers can also be 
liable to clients or third parties for wasted costs under inherent jurisdiction of the court.
16
 The 
grounds for such orders were formalised by the Court of Appeal in 1994
17
 and included in the 
Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (CPR).
 
Liability can also arise from complaints.  
 
The Law Society was given jurisdiction over consumer complaints following the Solicitors 
Act 1974, but this was amended in 1985 and 1990 to allow imposition of sanctions for 
inadequate professional services.
18
 The Law Society’s various complaints agencies attracted 
criticism for inefficiency and a single agency for all providers of legal services was 
established under the LSA.
19
 Constituted under a new Office for Legal Complaints, the Legal 
Ombudsman (LeO) became operative in 2010. LeO only had jurisdiction over complaints 
brought by recipients of legal services from providers authorised in respect of reserved legal 
activities;
20
 meaning rights of audience, conducting litigation, preparing certain documents 
relating to probate and conveyancing, acting as a notary and administering oaths. This 
covered all the work of approved persons, practising lawyers, including their delivery of non-
reserved activity. LeO has no jurisdiction over a large unregulated sector, estimated to 
comprise some 130,000 service providers in England and Wales.
21
  
 
Whereas the Law Society’s schemes did not deal with negligence claims, LeO adopted 
scheme rules providing that ‘[w]here a complaint is about professional negligence or 
judgement, the OLC will consider (on a case-by-case basis) whether the issue is one that the 
OLC can deal with or whether the issue would be better dealt with in court’.22 The fourth and 
final area of potential liability arises in relation to misconduct. Complaints to LeO can only 
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be made by clients in respect of matters within its remit, which does not include disciplinary 
matters, so the professions must maintain residual complaints processes, some of which may 
result in disciplinary proceedings. Disciplinary sanctions include fines, which are not paid to 
complainants. 
 
The gradual accumulation of consumer remedies explains why, before 1975, lawyers were 
not obliged to carry professional indemnity insurance (PII).
23
 Many solicitors’ firms did so to 
cover partnership liabilities, but the Solicitors Act 1974
 
gave the solicitors’ professional 
body, the Law Society, powers to make rules requiring protection from civil liability.
24
 
Following the Act the Law Society tried a number of mutual PII arrangements but the 
volatility of claims led to difficulties in sustaining the arrangements.
25
  Consequently, from 
September 2000 each principal in a law firm was required to obtain qualifying insurance with 
a participating insurer on the open market. The Law Society operated an Assigned Risk Pool 
(ARP) for firms unable to obtain insurance on the open market, but this was abandoned by 
the SRA in 2013. Firms unable to obtain insurance were then required to close.  
 
The current rules covering PII are made by the SRA as the independent regulator of solicitors 
under the LSA. The SRA Indemnity Insurance Rules 2013 require that solicitors must insure 
with participating insurers. There were 36 participating insurers approved for 2014/15
26
 
although the top six of these share about 80 per cent of the business.
27
 PII policies must meet 
minimum terms and conditions (MTCs), indemnifying firms against civil liability including 
psychological injury or emotional distress arising from a breach of duty in the performance of 
(or failure to perform) legal work
28
 and defence costs
29
 The MTCs allow only limited 
exclusions, for example, for death or bodily injury.
30
 Under the MTCs the minimum level of 
cover per claim is set at £2 million for sole practitioners and partnerships and £3 million for 
limited companies and limited liability partnerships. Firms can arrange any level of excess. If 
firms do not pay the excess the insurer must pay and claim from the firm. Insurers are not 
allowed to repudiate for non-disclosure, misrepresentation or failure to pay premiums.
31
 
Breaches reported to the SRA by insurers can result in misconduct charges or, in extreme 
cases, intervention in the firm’s operations.32 The Compensation Fund, also established under 
the Solicitors Act 1974, is maintained by practitioner contributions. It provides grants of up to 
£2 million to replace money stolen by a solicitor or to alleviate hardship, for example, when 
solicitors fail to account for client funds,
33
 but does not compensate victims of negligence. 
The SRA may waive the upper limit for payments.
34
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Self-employed barristers were required to have PII as a condition of practice from 1980. The 
Bar initially opted for an open market solution but, by 1985, the participating insurers had 
shrunk to two and only one was willing to provide a quotation to all Chambers.
35
 The criteria 
for setting premiums were not transparent, quotations were volatile and offers of insurance 
were often received late. As a result of these difficulties Bar Mutual Insurance Fund (BMIF) 
was established in 1988 and currently covers around 13,000 self-employed barristers. The 
terms of cover include civil liability and the sanctions and costs of disciplinary proceedings, 
subject to exclusions such as fraud.
36
 BMIF currently provides a minimum level of cover per 
claim of £500,000 and a maximum of £2,500,000. In 2014-15 a contribution assessed at 
between £100 and £300 would buy the basic cover of £500,000 and a contribution of £1,000 
would buy the maximum cover.
37
 Additional cover is available for £100 for each additional 
£500,000 of cover. The new independent regulator for barristers, the Bar Standards Board 
(BSB) requires that BSB authorised persons or bodies have PII
38
 but BMIF is only committed 
to considering applications from BSB regulated entities on a case by case basis.
39
 The BSB 
does not currently operate a compensation fund because the scope for fraud is limited; most 
barristers operate as independent practitioners and do not handle client money.  
 
THE NATURE OF DEFAULT 
 
Data sources 
Important indicators of lawyer default are the volume, value and incidence of claims, 
settlements and determinations. The legal professions’ regulators have not consistently 
collected, collated or published data.  BSB state that they receive no data from BMIF nor 
have leverage to obtain it.
40
 BMIF did not respond to a request from the author for 
information. The SRA faces the difficulty that private insurance companies treat their own 
data as commercially sensitive. Many did make aggregated data available to Charles Rivers 
Associates (CRA), consultants conducting a review of insurance arrangements for the SRA in 
2010.
41
 CRA also drew on data from the SIF scheme, from the operation of the ARP and 
from information provided by the Association of British Insurers (ABI) as at 30
th
 September 
2009.
42
 Its report suggested that the SRA was in the process of improving its reporting 
mechanisms to improve the sharing of information. In 2015, however, the SRA still had no 
useable data.
43
 Indications of the types, nature and scale of default can, however, be glimpsed 
from the fragments that are publicly available. Even were data more complete, they would 
not give a full picture of liability claims, for reasons explained in the sections that follow. In 
setting out these data, percentages are rounded to the nearest whole number except where 
small differences are significant. 
 
Conduct and liability    
Careless behaviour is common to the jurisdictions. The common law standard of care for 
negligence in professional work is that of the ‘ordinary skilled man exercising and professing 
to have that skill’.44 In this test the emphasis is on the standard of performance rather than the 
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outcome. A solicitor does not promise to win a case,
45
 but to perform with the care expected 
of a reasonably competent solicitor specialising in that particular area of law.
46
 Despite the 
implicit intention of the LSA to drive down legal costs through the commoditisation of legal 
services, the courts insist on high standards for legal professionals. The Court of Appeal 
recently held that a firm providing a cheap and efficient service by post must still explain 
matters in person to ‘unsophisticated’ clients.47 There is overlap between the conduct 
punished by awards in Negligence and the wasted costs and LeO jurisdictions. Wasted costs 
are payable when incurred as a result of improper, unreasonable or negligent act or omission, 
such as where a solicitor is forced to accept a third of the sum originally offered in settlement 
and is liable for costs three times the settlement figure.
48
 Third parties can seek wasted costs 
orders against opposing lawyers, but there are relatively few successful cases.
49
 This is partly 
because the adversarial system tends not to impose duties to help the other side, even when 
they are acting in person.
50
A problem area is the claim or defence that is plainly doomed to 
fail.
51
 Lawyers are only liable to third parties for wasted costs in such circumstances where it 
can be shown that a claim is an abuse of process
52
 or where no reasonably competent legal 
adviser would evaluate the chance of success as being such as to justify continuing with 
proceedings.
53
  
 
LeO views cases through the lens of inadequate professional service rather than negligence,
54
 
but the published data is organised in categories consistent with negligence; failure to advise, 
(18 per cent of all complaints), failure to follow instructions (16 per cent), delay (8 per cent), 
failure to progress (8 per cent), failure to keep informed (7 per cent) and failure to reply (6 
per cent). To obtain compensation complainants must prove direct financial loss. Allowable 
categories include inconvenience and distress, correcting a specified error, omission or other 
deficiency or taking specified action in the interests of the complainant.
55
 Cases of 
misconduct dealt with by disciplinary tribunals may give rise to fines but not to compensation 
for victims. Nevertheless the conduct often traverses the boundaries of other kinds of default. 
This can be illustrated in relation to the regulators’ complaints jurisdiction. In 2013/14 the 
BSB handled 499 internal complaints, those brought by the BSB, and 433 external 
complaints.
56
 The external complaints included 15 cases of incompetence, 18 of not acting in 
the client’s best interests and 14 of undue delay in dealing with papers.57 Some conduct might 
be grounds for wasted costs orders; there were, for example, 151 cases of dishonesty or 
discreditable conduct and 98 case of misleading the court. None of these claims were defined 
as potential negligence claims, although 5 had been in the previous year. Of the BSB 
caseload, 29 were referred to a disciplinary tribunal
58
 and around 10 might have been referred 
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to LeO.
59
 As is clear from these examples of conduct, there are similarities in lawyer 
behaviour dealt with in the different jurisdictions. 
 
Jurisdictions 
In cases other than applications for wasted costs decided summarily, claimants have some 
choice of venue. The main determinant is the value of compensation. From February 2013 LeO 
could order authorised persons to pay compensation of up to £50,000 for direct financial loss, 
together with interest and costs. In pursuing claims over £50,000 through the courts 
complainants face financial and other barriers. Legal aid for Negligence claims has been 
replaced by different forms of contingency fee agreement, but restrictions on success fees 
chargeable deter lawyers taking on claims with even modest litigation risk. Claims under 
£10,000 are generally determined without a formal hearing and lawyers’ costs are not 
recoverable.
60
 LeO therefore offers distinct advantages over the court system to those with low 
value claims. The LSA requirement that ombudsman complaints are resolved ‘quickly and with 
minimum formality’61 demands an economic process which includes a participative informal 
resolution procedure. Although LeO’s literature emphasises that little is gained by adjudication 
nearly half of concluded cases go to hearing. This is a common feature of ombudsman schemes.  
  
The volume of matters 
The information available on the numbers of matters varies significantly between 
jurisdictions. The 932 complaints handled by BSB, as described at the end of the section 
before last, can be contrasted with the 50 most recent regulatory decisions published on the 
SRA’s website.62 Between May 23rd and June 25th 2015 ten of these decisions were for 
referral to the SDT, and seven involved Regulatory Settlement Agreements, typically minor 
matters that could have been referred to the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT). The 
balance mainly covered interventions in firms, conditions imposed and rebukes. Since the 
latest 50 cases were generated in a month it is likely that the SRA makes around 600 
regulatory dispositions relating to solicitors during the course of a year. The SDT handles 
around two hundred applications involving practising solicitors annually.
63
 In 2013-14 the 
highest fine imposed was £40,000 and the next £20,000.   
In its 2013 report LeO reported receiving 71,000 ‘contacts’ and handling 7,630 cases against 
all authorised persons.
64
 This differs considerably from the 18,500 complaints against 
solicitors handled annually by the last of the Law Society’s complaints agencies, the Legal 
Complaints Service, in 2010. The difference is explained by how ‘contacts’ are recorded and 
complaints defined. Of the compensatory jurisdictions LeO provides the best data on cases 
that are accepted onto its scheme in its Annual Reports. Of the 4,682 cases it concluded in 
2013/14, around 2,439 involved payments apparently similar to those involved in negligence 
cases.
65
 In 1,885 cases lawyers paid compensation for the emotional impact or disruption 
caused by the failure. Other categories, such as paying complainants’ expenses, may have 
formed part of a claim. In a further 32 cases an order to pay someone else to complete work 
was made. The alternative in a negligence claim is a financial award to cover this cost.  
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Apart from the periods of mutual insurance in the solicitors’ profession it is more difficult to 
determine the numbers of liability claims made through the courts. During the ten years 
between 1987 and 1996, for example, SIF paid out on 32,461 claims.
66
 There is no equally 
reliable data to compare this with. Recent Law Society research established that 40 per cent 
of a sample of firms had notified their insurer of circumstances that could give rise to a claim 
against the firm in the previous year, and just over 22 per cent had received a claim that they 
passed to their insurers.
67
 Since there are very roughly 10,000 private practice firms
68
 the 
figures suggest around 4,000 claims made and around 2,000 handed to insurers. These figures 
suggest that there could be significantly fewer claims being paid out than the average of just 
over 3,000 per annum during the SIF period, particularly if the settlement rate is low. 
 
The value of compensation  
SIF records suggest that the value of claims for the year was around £220 million in 
1999/2000 and £226 million in 2000/2001. Data supplied by the Association of British 
Insurers to CRA suggests that between 2002-3 and 2009-10, PII premiums covering the MTC 
were between £200 million and £250 million annually. Adverse conclusions about the rising 
global figure for default must take account of the steady growth of the solicitors’ profession 
and changes in the numbers of firms seeking insurance cover. In 2001 there were 68,466 
solicitors in private practice and 8,319 firms in England and Wales earning at least £15,000 
per annum.
69
 Therefore, average compensation payments made by insurance companies were 
around £3,400 per solicitor and £27,000 per firm. By 2009, the numbers of solicitors in 
private practice firms had increased to over 85,000 and, although the Law Society could no 
longer verify whether firms were active, the number of firms on its REGIS database had 
increased to 10,362.
70
 Based on the value of premiums for the compulsory MTC in 2008/09, 
£245.6 million,
71
 average liability had actually fallen to £2,885 per solicitor and to £23,702 
per firm. The apparent downward trend in payments per head must be treated with caution. 
Premiums are only a rough guide to compensation paid. Claims against large firms, for 
example, may well lead to damages awards in many millions but firms need only insure up to 
£2 million per claim, the primary layer insurance, and different levels of excess, or 
`deductible’, are often payable on each claim. In addition to PII claims, the SRA 
Compensation Fund typically made payments of between £10 million and £21 million each 
year between 2000 and in 2010.
72
 The annual cost of solicitors’ default since then has 
probably been between £210 million (the lower end of combined PII and Compensation Fund 
payments in the preceding periods) and £270 million (the upper end). These figures were 
confirmed by SRA as correct for 2014/15.
73
 
 
BMIF reports suggest that outstanding claims against barristers tend to exceed £30 million at 
the end of each year, but settlements totalled only £8,261,088 in 2009 and £13,298,286 in 
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2010.
74
 There are two obvious points of comparison with the figures for solicitors. The first is 
the relative volatility of payments year on year, confirmed by payments of £14,508,361 for 
the financial year to March 2013 and £9,211,593 for the 2014 financial year.
75
 The second is 
the much smaller scale of barristers’ PII. This is partly due to the Bar being a smaller 
profession, but average payments per head are also smaller. There were 12,420 (80.7%) self-
employed barristers in 2010. Taking the higher figure for that year as the reference point, the 
compensation per barrister averaged nearly £1,071, significantly less than the solicitors’ 
£2,885 per head for the previous year and a fraction of the £23,702 payable per solicitors’ 
firm. It has been noted that each barrister is an independent practitioner with no qualified 
staff and no capacity to handle funds, but another variable is gross fees. Whereas gross fees 
for the solicitors’ profession in 2009 were around £19 billion,76 around £223,000 per head 
and approaching £2 million per firm, they were probably significantly less on average for 
barristers. This is difficult to verify but is a figure consistent with available data.  
 
In 2012 the chair of the Young Bar Committee (YBC) estimated that young barristers at the 
criminal Bar could expect to earn less than £20,000 in the first few years post-pupillage less 
tax and expenses.
77
 Another QC suggested that this could rise to £50-60,000 p.a. less tax and 
overheads of 30 per cent for a typical criminal barrister of 4-5 year’s call and experience in 
all criminal court trials.
78
 At the top end of criminal legal aid work only 3 barristers earned 
between £750,000 and £1 million from criminal legal aid in 2009 and none did so in 2013.
79
  
In 2013 only four barristers earned between £500,000 and £750,000 from legal aid and a 
further 27 earned between £300,000 and £500,000. The chair of the YBC suggested that one 
family set claimed its barristers earned from £60,000 in the first year to £120,000 after seven 
years, gross per annum. At the commercial Bar he indicated initial earnings approaching six 
figures, with successful barristers earning over £250,000 after seven years. 
 
LeO received 7,995 complaints against approved persons in 2013-4. Of these 94 per cent 
were about solicitors (7,516) and nearly 4 per cent were about barristers.
80
 Solicitors 
comprised about 89 per cent of combined practitioner numbers of approximate 145,000 
(130,000 solicitors and 15,000 barristers) and, particularly given the fact they have more 
contact with clients, were only slightly over-represented. There was found to be no evidence 
of poor service in 48 per cent of resolved cases. The remainder were either settled informally 
or determined by Ombudsman’s decision.81 Settlements under £299 comprised 26 per cent of 
informal resolutions and 16.6 per cent of Ombudsman’s decisions. These small claims 
represented an even larger percentage of disposals because the total includes dismissed 
claims. In only 0.2 per cent of informal resolutions (6 cases) and 0.5 per cent of determined 
cases (16 cases) were complainants awarded more than £20,000. A further 161 cases were 
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determined or settled with compensation of between £5,000 and £20,000. The total 
compensation awarded by LeO appears to be considerably less than £1 million. In the 
majority of such cases representation in court proceedings would not have been economic 
and most such claims would be within the scope of an insurance excess. 
 
The incidence of liability claims  
Little is known about the volume of different kinds of liability claims against barristers. 
BMIF annual reports contain scant detail beyond total claims, payments and premiums. It 
does however publish a rating schedule according to which the basic level of contribution is 
applied to income declared under different areas of work. This is apparently set to reflect 
inherent risk, with crime and family rated at 0.15 per cent and non-contentious revenue work 
at .6 per cent. The highest rate is 2 per cent applied to Chancery work, non-residential 
landlord and tenant and defamation.
82
 The Chairman of BMIF has said that the abolition of 
advocates’ immunity had absolutely no impact on PII claims.83  
 
Material on the incidence of claims against solicitors would also be scarce but for the CRA 
data. Insurers reported disproportionate claims from those establishing practices soon after 
gaining the permitted three years post qualification experience (PQE) and from overseas 
lawyers becoming solicitors by taking the Qualified Lawyers Transfer Test (QLTT). Dividing 
the value of claims against practitioners in different sizes of practice by the numbers of 
practitioners in each category suggests that sole practitioners and partnerships with fewer 
than five partners were responsible for higher aggregate value claims per fee earner.
84
 Sole 
practitioners were responsible for three times the value of claims compared with their 
number, two partner firms around five times more and three to four partner firms four times 
more. There was also evidence that default is linked to some areas of practice. As shown in 
Figure 1, during the period of the SIF, commercial work, conveyancing and litigation, 
personal injury work in particular, consistently produced the largest numbers of claims.  
 
Figure 1 about here 
Between 1992 and 1996 conveyancing was the source of nearly 34 per cent of the number of 
claims and 27 per cent of the value of claims.
85
 In contrast, criminal law produced just 0.03 
per cent of claims by value and 0.24 per cent by number.
86
 There are a number of possible 
explanations for this phenomenon. Most obviously, conveyancing is traditionally the main 
work of most solicitors’ firms and continues to be significant by volume and value. Research 
reported by the Legal Services Board in 2010 showed that conveyancing represented thirteen 
per cent of defined areas of solicitors’ work by gross turnover, second only to finance and 
business at thirty one per cent.
87
 The profession has always urged that data on conveyancing 
default be viewed in perspective. In 1996, the chairman of a Law Society Conveyancing 
Working Party estimated that between 1987 and 1994 solicitors conducted 23 million land 
transactions and that conveyancing accounted for only seven claims per 10,000 
transactions.
88
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 The spike in claims depicted in Figure 1 can be explained by various factors including court 
decisions. The courts had traditionally argued that not every error by a professional person 
indicates negligence
89
 and that practitioners need not be particularly meticulous or 
conscientious.
90
 From the mid-1970s decisions against surveyors, valuers, architects and 
engineers suggested a harder judicial line.
91
 In 1993 the Law Lord, Lord Hoffman explained 
the expansion of professional liability as an example of judicial risk allocation arguing: 
‘What you are getting very close to there is treating the conveyancing solicitor as if he had contracted to 
produce a result.  He has contracted to give you a clear title and practically any mistake on his part which 
prevents that result from being attained will attract liability.  The underlying truth seems to be that judges 
regard conveyancing as an activity which should give a result to the client.’92 
Another hypothesis is that the data in the SIF period was distorted by solicitors implicated in 
conveyancing fraud. A buoyant property market in the 1980s led to a considerable ‘over-
lending’, subsequently exposed by re-possession of property in negative equity. The volume 
of conveyancing PII claims would have been swollen by claims against innocent partners for 
the fraud of dishonest members of firms. Some of the remainder may have ended up as 
Compensation Fund claims. This link is supported by the fact that the Law Society won a test 
case defeating prospective claims of £25 million against the Compensation Fund in relation 
to solicitors assisting purchasers to buy overvalued properties.
93
 Another credible explanation 
of the SIF figures is that conveyancing is relatively high value work conducted across the 
profession including by small firms, the group with the highest claims incidence. The 1980s 
spike may then be explained by cost-cutting to compete on price with licensed 
conveyancers.
94
 The relationship between conveyancing claims and small firms is supported 
by CRA data. It shows that commercial conveyancing accounted for 11.2 per cent of the 
value of claims made on the SIF but was the source of only 4.1 per cent of the number of 
claims. It also showed that law firms with less than five partners generated 64 per cent of the 
value of all property claims.  
 
Data from the post-2001 period showed that conveyancing continued to be a major source of 
claims against the small firm members of the ARP. After 2005/06, a time when the pool 
contained no firms with more than 5 partners,
95
 conveyancing generated eighty five per cent 
of the value of claims against member firms.
96
 The negligence claims within this figure may 
be due to the gearing of conveyancing firms. CRA found that many firms with less than five 
partners had large numbers of staff without practising certificates. It is also possible that 
fraud continued to be a problem. Rules tightening up on acting for purchaser and lender were 
not introduced until 2007
97
 and claims by mortgage lenders represented around 50 per cent of 
all claims against firms in the ARP, and around 60 per cent of all conveyancing claims. It is 
not known to what extent the 2007 rule changes helped to abate conveyancing claims. 
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Between 2008 and 2010 Compensation Fund payments rose from £9.23 million to £21.2 
million. It may be coincidental that this spike, and the spike in the SIF period, coincided with 
a decline in the property market. If the majority of claims are rooted in negligence rather than 
fraud, it would suggest that the decline of property value encourages parties to focus on 
mistakes that might be overlooked in a rising market as a cause of loss of value. The SRA 
recently suggested, however, that conveyancing continues to be a major source of claims 
under the open market regime.
98
 Announcing a recent review of conveyancing regulation the 
SRA noted that:     
‘ many insurers that have responded to consultation have argued that much of their risk management and 
underwriting resource is now focused not on negligence but on dishonesty – either from within 
authorised bodies or through authorised bodies' risk management and controls systems being so weak as 
to allow them to become subject to the activities of dishonest third parties.’
99
  
Better data would be needed to confirm the proportions of claims due to fraud and to 
negligence.  
 
High-risk areas of work indicated by PII data can be usefully compared to those indicated in 
complaints data. The majority of complaints to LeO were about residential conveyancing, (20 
per cent of the total) Family Law (18 per cent), Wills and Probate (13 per cent) personal 
injury (10 per cent) and Litigation (10 per cent). There were small numbers of complaints, 
around, 100 each, about commercial law services (1 per cent) and Financial Law services (1 
per cent), possibly because the value of such claims exceeds LeO’s jurisdiction. These data 
are relatively stable. Of the 7,370 complaints registered in 2014-15 the most concern 
residential conveyancing (23 per cent), followed by Family Law (14 per cent), personal 
injury (12 per cent) and Wills and Probate (11.85 per cent).
100
 Two of the areas, 
conveyancing and personal injury, are also in the top four substantive areas identified by 
CRA. The notable exceptions are commercial areas, which are significant in the value of PII 
claims but are less than two per cent of total complaints. LeO’s data suggests that the largest 
category of default in residential conveyancing was failure to advise (24 per cent of cases) 
and the next failure to follow instructions.
101
 None of 15 other categories of default exceeded 
ten per cent. A category of ‘potential misconduct’ accounted for seven per cent of cases.   
 
Conclusion 
 
Although the data are patchy and the overall picture inconclusive there are two large areas of 
regulatory activity where the material outlined in this article is provocative. First, the data 
raises questions about the differences in default between different types of lawyer and 
between different areas of work within the same profession. Analysis of the factors 
underlying these differences may help in understanding default and identifying regulatory 
interventions that may be effective. Second, it raises questions about the effectiveness of 
different jurisdictions in dealing with default. There may be lessons to be learned from, for 
example, the conditions of participation, the effectiveness of remedies in each jurisdiction 
and the accountability of legal services providers in each jurisdiction. It is proposed to reflect 
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briefly on these questions before returning to consider the potential for using insurance and 
complaints data in order to better understand lawyer default.   
 
One of the notable features of the causes of default is the clear difference in the scale of the 
default of solicitors and barristers, the two professions considered in this article, and the kinds 
of activity regarded as risky. Compensation payments per head are nearly two thirds more for 
solicitors than barristers, there is a rising trend in the value of claims against solicitors over a 
period of years and some areas of work, notably conveyancing and personal injury, are 
consistently implicated in these rises. Further data is required in order to explain these 
differences adequately. Working hypotheses include the fact that solicitors could be more 
prone to liability claims and complaints than barristers. This could be for a number of 
reasons, including different modes of practice, different areas of work and different practice 
requirements. A significant factor could be the fact that barristers cannot handle client 
money. The upward trend in the value of claims against solicitors could point to failings in 
regulation or could be explained by factors such as judicial attitudes to professional 
negligence, increased numbers of practitioners or larger commercial settlements. The 
consistently high value of insurance payments in respect of solicitors handling conveyancing 
and personal injury could result from small numbers of large individual claims in those areas 
or large numbers of claims against small solicitors’ firms. Both kinds of claim could be due 
to fraud or negligence.   
 
Identifying more closely the nature of default is the key to determining effective intervention, 
whether in terms of educational provision, conduct rules or regulatory activity. If a high 
proportion of Compensation Fund and PII claims involve payments in respect of dishonesty, 
this raises questions about the level of default that is to be expected, or is ‘acceptable’, in 
relation to that area of work. If it is decided that prevailing levels of default are not tolerable, 
it then falls to decide whether the causes of such claims are remediable and what measures 
might reduce their impact. One solution may be to review licensing requirements for areas of 
high risk, for example, imposing specific entry requirements, activity authorisation or regular 
audits on providers. Another may be to change the nature of operations, for example, 
imposing restrictions on handling client money in relation to some solicitors or some areas of 
work. This may not assist, however, if the major problem is mortgage fraud, which need not 
depend on handling money. The appropriateness of any targeted measure depends on the size 
of the market, the scale of activity and the proportionality of regulatory intervention.   
 
The second large question raised by the data relates to the limitations of the venue dealing 
with default. The LeO data points to a possibly significant overlap between jurisdictions in 
default involving negligence. Cases gravitate to the different jurisdictions according to factors 
such as whether loss was caused, how much loss was caused, who it was caused to and the 
circumstances in which it occurred. The courts are by far the most significant liability 
jurisdiction by volume and value of claims, even though claimants face potential costs 
barriers in bringing claims. The value limit for LeO cases forces higher value claims into the 
court system where claimants risk incurring high costs or losing part of their damages as the 
cost of a fee agreement with their lawyer. Despite these difficulties, clients of the professions 
regulated under the LSA enjoy a relatively privileged position under present arrangements. 
Two significant groups face greater difficulty in pursuing remedies for lawyer default. The 
first group is third parties which, because LeO’s jurisdiction is restricted to clients, are forced 
into the court system. This may be considered bad policy in terms of encouraging lawyers to 
strike a balance in pursuing client rights while avoiding third party harms. The second group 
suffering prejudice is the clients of a growing unregulated legal services sector. Clients in this 
sector may find that legal services providers are uninsured and that LeO has no jurisdiction 
over its activities.
102
  
 
In considering the role of data in policy formation it is important to note that a potentially 
considerable volume of lawyer default is unrecorded. This may be because default is 
undetected. Some of the data considered in this article points to this possibility. For example, 
several of the complaints categories concern failures the discovery of which is probably 
accidental. Data may also be unreliable because, although default exists, victims are 
disinclined to pursue remedies or are required to prove a causal link to harm before receiving 
compensation. The consequence of these difficulties is twofold. First, they may undermine 
the case for greater reliance on liability claims, and insurance requirements, as mechanisms 
for controlling lawyer default. Second, the potential for the significant under-recording of 
default means that policy makers need to be aware of data limitations when formulating 
regulatory policy. Despite these caveats, published data appears to offer considerable 
potential both for understanding lawyer default and for tailoring interventions. Insurance data 
provides indications of the scale of detected and remediable default and of particular risk 
areas. These data are potentially useful in determining regulatory focus and intervention 
strategies. They enable options to be considered in the light of the reasons for default, the 
overall sums involved and the convenience to clients of existing arrangements. Complaints 
data are more detailed. They could be particularly useful in identifying the kinds of errors that 
typically occur in particular kinds of work. This information could also be useful in shaping 
regulatory policy, but might also assist in designing education and training or in refining 
workplace systems designed to minimise lawyer default. These observations suggest that 
greater transparency in data collection, collation and publication may well be the key to 
understanding and regulating default.  
 
 
                                                          
102
 LeO Annual report 2013-14, above. 
 
